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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DESIGNATE SPECIALIST PATENT TRIAL JUDGES?  AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF H.R. 628 IN LIGHT OF THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE AND THE WORK 
OF PROFESSOR MOORE 
 
Donna M. Gitter1 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
currently reverses from one-third to nearly one-half of all U.S. district 
court patent claim construction decisions.  Because claim construction 
often determines the outcome of patent litigation, the high appellate claim 
construction reversal rate contributes to significant uncertainty among 
inventors and investors.  Congress is currently considering legislation, 
H.R. 628, which will designate specialist district court patent judges to 
reduce this unacceptably high reversal rate. 
This Article concludes that designation of specialist patent trial 
judges among the federal district court judiciary is likely to reduce the 
high appellate claim construction reversal rate, based upon an empirical 
analysis of the appellate claim construction reversal rate in England, 
which has specialized patent tribunals.  Part I of the Article examines 
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proposed U.S. legislation that would designate specialized patent trial 
judges.  Part II analyzes the patent claim construction process in the 
United States, enumerating the challenges faced by generalist U.S. district 
court judges charged with deciding highly complex patent litigation 
actions.  Part III then examines the English patent claim construction 
process, drawing numerous parallels between patent litigation in the 
United States and England that render the English system a valid 
comparator when considering the respective appellate claim construction 
reversal rates in the two jurisdictions.  Part IV presents empirical resul ts 
that strongly support the notion that designation of specialist patent trial 
judges in the United States could indeed decrease the appellate claim 
construction reversal rate, thereby affording certainty to patent litigants 
and investors.  Part V then explains why the approach proposed in H.R. 
628 is superior to the current English system of specialized patent trial 







The U.S. Congress is currently considering legislation, H.R. 628, which would 
―establish a pilot program in certain United States district courts to encourage 
enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district judges.‖ 2  This legislation aims 
to foster increased patent trial experience among U.S. district court judges in order to 
reduce the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit‘s (the Federal Circuit) 3 
high rate of reversal of U.S. district court decisions pertaining to technical and 
substantive patent law issues.4  Many scholars,5 judges,6 and legislators7 have decried the 
results of the current system, with its high reversal rate, as unacceptable.  
                                                 
2 H.R. 628, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h628rfs.txt.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
3 See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text regarding the establishment and role of the 
Federal Circuit.  
4 H.R. 628 specifies that the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report including, among other 
things, a comparison of ―the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, of 
such cases on the issues of claim construction and substantive patent law.‖  H.R. 628, 111th Cong. 
§ 1(e)(1)(C)(i) (2009).  Claim construction is the process by which the court determines what 
invention is claimed in the patent application.  See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text for 
an explanation of the claim construction phase of patent litigation.  
5 See Gretchen A. Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is 
Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. Intell. Prop. L. 175, 207 (2001) 
(finding that the Federal Circuit reversed 40 percent of the 160 claim constructions appealed from 
the 1996 Markman decision through 2000); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1075, 1100-01, 1104 (2001) 
(finding that the Federal Circuit reversed 44 percent of the 179 district court claim constructions 
that were appealed from January 1, 1998 to April 30, 2000); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight 
Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 231, 238-39 
(2005) [hereinafter Moore, Markman] (finding that the Federal Circuit determined that the district 
courts wrongly interpreted 34.5 percent of all claim terms that were appealed from 1996 to 2003, 
when considering the claims on a term-by-term basis, and that the figure would be 37.5 percent 
when considering the percentage of cases in which one or more claim terms was misconstrued); 
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. 
& Tech. 1, 8-12 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped] (finding that 
district court judges improperly construed patent claims in 33 percent of the cases appealed to and 
decided by the Federal Circuit during the period between April 23, 1996 and December 31, 
2000); Ajay Singh, Interlocutory Appeals in Patent Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2): Are 
They Still Justified and Are They Implemented Correctly?, 55 Duke L.J. 179, 179 nn.3-4 (2005) 
(collecting authorities asserting reversal rates of 33 to 71 percent); Symposium, A Panel 
Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 671, 680 (2004) (noting a survey showing that the claim construction reversal rate for the six 
months prior to this study was 71 percent and that the rate for the prior year was 58 percent); 




Many commentators attribute the relatively high claim construction reversal rate 
to the fact that federal district court judges lack ―both technical training and frequent 
exposure to patent cases in general and patent claim construction issues in particular.‖ 8  
One potential legislative solution to this problem, H.R. 628, was reintroduced in the 
House of Representatives on January 22, 2009 by Representative Darrell E. Issa (R-CA) 
where it passed overwhelmingly.9  As explained in one summary of the bill, H.R. 628 
aims to improve patent jurisprudence by establishing a ten-year pilot program permitting 
certain trial judges in specific districts to decline patent cases and other judges in those 
districts to choose to accept such cases, thereby creating a cadre of specialist judges in 
particular districts.10  Legislators hope that enhancing the patent expertise of trial judges 
will introduce efficiencies in the patent litigation process that will not only reduce the rate 
at which the Federal Circuit reverses trial court patent decisions, but will also reduce the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for 
Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 711, 741-42 (2003) (finding that 
in 2001 the Federal Circuit reversed 41.5 percent of trial court Markman hearing claim 
construction decisions).   
6 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 & n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., 
dissenting from the pronouncements on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in 
the judgment) (citing a 38.3 percent reversal rate during the period from the 1995 Markman 
decision until November 1997). 
7 See 152 Cong. Rec. H7851 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Rep. F. James 
Sensenbrenner (R – WI)) (indicating that ―the rate of reversal on claim construction issues 
remains excessive‖).   
8 William C. Rooklidge & Mansi H. Shah, Creation of the Right to Interlocutory Appeal of 
Patent Claim Construction Rulings and Mandatory Stay Pending Appeal, The Coalition for 21st 
Century Patent Reform, July 10, 2007, at 8, 
http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/Interlocutory_Review_Paper.pdf (citing federal judges 
and scholars who emphasize the beneficial effect upon appellate judicial decision-making in 
patent cases due to the judges‘ technical training and frequent exposure to patent litigation).  See 
infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for a fuller description of the expertise of the judges of 
the Federal Circuit.  
9 The Library of Congress, Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.00628: 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2009).  The accompanying Senate bill, S. 299, was introduced in the Senate 
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Library of Congress, Thomas, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN00299: (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).  The bill 
was previously introduced as H.R. 34 in the 110th Congress.  The Library of Congress, Thomas, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00034: (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).   
10 H.R. 628, 111th Cong. § 1(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2009), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h628rfs.txt.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2009),  




time and expense of patent litigation, thereby providing needed certainty to inventors and 
investors.11   
If enacted, H.R. 628 would establish a program whereby the chief judge of a 
judicial district involved in the pilot project would designate certain district court judges 
who request to hear cases involving patent or plant variety protection issues.  Such cases 
would still be randomly assigned to district court judges, regardless of whether the judges 
are so designated.  However, a judge not designated to whom such a case was assigned 
could decline to accept the case,12 and the case would then be randomly reassigned to one 
of the designated judges.13  The pilot program would involve at least five U.S. district 
courts in at least three different judicial circuits, and these courts would be among the 
fifteen district courts in which the largest number of patent cases were filed in the most 
recent calendar year.14  H.R. 628 also allots five million dollars annually to educate 
judges who opt to hear patent cases, as well as for the compensation of law clerks with 
technical expertise to assist these judges.15   
This Article concludes that designation of specialist patent trial judges among the 
judges of the U.S. district courts is likely to reduce the high appellate claim construction 
reversal rate, based upon an empirical analysis of the appellate claim construction 
reversal rate in England, which has a system of specialist patent tribunals and a legal 
system comparable to our own.  Part II of this Article analyzes the patent claim 
construction process in the United States, enumerating the challenges faced by generalist 
U.S. district court judges charged with deciding highly complex patent litigation actions.  
Part III then examines the English patent claim construction process, drawing numerous 
                                                 
11 152 Cong. Rec. H7851 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner 
(R-WI)) (testifying that ―[i]t is widely recognized that patent litigation has become too expensive, 
too time consuming, and too unpredictable‖ and asserting that the bill, then H.R. 34, addresses 
these concerns).  
12 Typically, federal district court judges must have senior status in order to decline cases.  See 
Nancy Olson, Comment, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s Proposed 
District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 745, 780 (2008) (stating that senior 
judges who currently do not wish to hear patent cases ―already frequently pass them along to 
junior judges‖); cf. William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine 
Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233, 1282 n.299 (1996) (citing examples of federal district 
court judges who have elected to take senior status in order to avoid sentencing drug cases 
according to the federal mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines).  
13 See H.R. 628 § 1(a)(1) (2009).  The purpose of the random case assignment is to minimize 
forum shopping.  152 Cong. Rec. H7851 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Rep. F. James 
Sensenbrenner (R–WI)) (testifying that the bill ―preserves the continued random assignment of 
cases to prevent the pilot districts from becoming magnets for forum-shopping litigants‖).  
14 H.R. 628 § 1(b) (2009).  The legislation further specifies that the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts may only designate a court in which at least ten 
district judges are authorized for presidential appointment and at least three of the judges have 
requested to hear such cases.  Id. 
15 Id. § 1(f). 




parallels between patent litigation in the United States and England that render the 
English system a valid comparator when considering the respective appellate claim 
construction reversal rates in the two jurisdictions.  In Part IV, this Article presents 
empirical results that strongly support the notion that designation of specialist patent trial 
judges in the United States could indeed lessen the appellate claim construction reversal 
rate, thereby lending certainty to investors and litigants involved in the patent process.  
Part V then explains why H.R. 628 is superior to one proposed alternative, which is the 
implementation of a specialized U.S. patent trial court. 
 
 
II. THE PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Like other legal actions, a patent action proceeds in the U.S. district court where 
the defendant resides or has minimum contacts, 16 as long as venue requirements are 
satisfied.17  As one commentator noted, ―While personal jurisdiction is meant to ensure 
that the court has legal authority over the litigants, venue rules are designed to promote 
fairness and efficiency by requiring that a suit be litigated where most convenient for 
both parties.‖18  Under the patent venue statute, ―[a]ny civil action for patent 
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where 
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place 
of business.‖19  Presently, the most popular venues for patent litigation are the Northern 
and Central Districts of California, the Eastern District of Texas, the District Court of 
Delaware, the Eastern District of Virginia, the Northern District of Illinois, and the 
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.20  Factors that may account for the 
popularity of these districts are  
 
                                                 
16 See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 
Yale J.L. & Tech. 193, 196 (2007) (―Personal jurisdiction generally exists where the defendant 
has had ‗minimal contacts‘ with the forum and has ‗purposefully availed himself‘ of commercial 
benefits from his affiliation with the forum.‖ (citations omitted)).  U.S. patent law provides that 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all patent infringement matters.  Id.  
17 Id. (―As a general matter, the rules of civil procedure dictate that a civil lawsuit may be 
brought in any court having personal and subject matter jurisdiction, as long as venue 
requirements are met.‖). 
18 Id. at 197. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2006).  
20 Reed Smith, Practice Areas & Industry Groups: Patent Litigation, 
http://www.reedsmith.com/practice_areas_&_industry_groups.cfm?widCall1=customWidgets.co
ntent_view_1&cit_id=8488 (last visited June 19, 2008); see also Leychkis, supra note 16, at 204 
(citing the top ten patent litigation venues for the period from 2002 to 2006).  




the reputation of [the] district‘s judges and their experience in patent 
matters, the swiftness of adjudication in that district, whatever local patent 
rules exist, the likelihood of getting to jury trial, the likelihood of winning 
the case, the leanings of the local jury pool, the relative reputations of the 
parties in the district, and the simple geographic convenience.21    
 
According to Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit, among the most important 
challenges facing the trial judge in a patent action is to determine what invention is 
claimed by the patent at issue; this phase of the trial is called claim construction.22  As 
one scholar explained, under both U.S. and English law, claims are included as part of the 
patent application and are designed to determine the extent of the patent‘s protection by 
demarcating what is old and obvious, and therefore unpatentable, from that which is new 
and inventive.23  The claims also put the public on notice of the patentee‘s rights. 24  As 
noted by Professor Moore, now a Federal Circuit Court judge, ―[d]efining the meaning 
and scope of the claim terms is the first step in any patent infringement analysis.‖25 
In addition to being the first step in a patent infringement suit, determination of 
the scope of the patent claims is important since ―to decide what the claims mean is 
nearly always to decide the case.‖26  Judge Giles Rich, one of the principal authors of the 
U.S. Patent Act, is often quoted as stating that ―the name of the game is the claim.‖ 27 
In order to ensure predictability and clarity in the claim construction phase of the 
trial, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc. that claim construction is ―exclusively within the province of the court,‖ 
thereby removing the responsibility from juries.28  Thus, under Markman, trial judges 
                                                 
21 Leychkis, supra note 16, at 202. 
22 See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: 
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 71. 
23 Matthew Fisher, The Tyranny of Words: Patent Claim Construction in the UK and US, 36 
Common L. World Rev. 262, 265-66 (2007).  
24 Id. at 266. 
25 Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 5 (internal citations omitted).  
26 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, C.J., 
concurring); see also Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 8 (―How the 
judge construes the patent claims is often dispositive of the infringement and validity analysis.‖).  
27 Fisher, supra note 23, at 266 & n.18 (quoting Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and 
Interpretation of Claims - American Perspectives, 21 Int‘l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L., 497, 
499 (1990)).  
28 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996), aff’g 
Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  




―bear the initial responsibility for claim interpretation,‖29 a complex task requiring 
understanding of the technology involved.30  District court judges generally hear the 
evidence and argument regarding claim construction either in summary judgment briefing 
or in a mini-trial called a Markman hearing.31  Moreover, in reaching a decision, a district 
court judge ―attempt[s] to step in the shoes of a person skilled in the technical field of the 
patented invention and determine from that vantage point what the terminology in the 
patent claim means,‖ because patent claims are interpreted from the perspective of ―one 
of ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains,‖ not a ―reasonable man‖ 
standard.32  Patent claims are particularly difficult to decipher both because patent 
lawyers draft claims quite broadly in order to cover as many future variants as possible, 
and also because the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office requires that each claim be 
drafted as a single sentence, no matter its length.33 
Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit describes the claim construction challenge 
facing trial court judges as follows: 
 
The way the language of the claims is construed is often outcome-
determinative in a patent-infringement suit.  Though there are exceptions, 
the structure of the accused device usually is not hard to determine; the 
question is always whether the claims read on, i.e., cover, that structure.  
So reading claims is an art of sorts, involving half technology and half 
linguistics.  To many trial judges it is a foreign art; understandably, they 
are not batting 1.000 (more like .500).34 
 
Compounding the challenge of deciding the complex technical issues raised in 
patent cases is the fact that most federal district court judges have very little patent trial 
experience.  Estimates suggest that a district court judge presides over less than one 
                                                 
29 Plager, supra note 22, at 71. 
30 See id.   
31 See Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that district 
court judges have broad discretion over when and whether to hold a Markman hearing, and over 
the evidence they will admit); see also Thomas K. McBride, Patent Practice in London – Local 
Internationalism: How Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom with 
Europe, the United States, and the Rest of the World, 2 Loy. U. Chi. Int‘l Rev. 31, 54-55 (2004-
05) (stating that, after Markman, ―a bifurcation is required for almost every patent trial, where the 
first step now consists of a Markman hearing in order to decide claim construction and validity, 
and the second step consists of a jury trial applying the constructed claims after judicial 
interpretation to any relevant facts on infringing devices‖).  
32 Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 6 (citations omitted).  
33 See Plager, supra note 22, at 71. 
34 Id. 




patent trial per year on average.35  What is more, according to Judge James Holderman of 
the Northern District of Illinois, because district court judges must be generalists in order 
to deal with their large and diverse caseloads, they ―typically cannot concentrate on 
staying abreast of the changing nuances of any specific area of the law.‖36  Judge Avern 
Cohn of the Eastern District of Michigan explains that ―[D]istrict judges have to 
constantly learn and re-learn patent law.  They simply cannot keep current with 
developments in the law.‖37  Judge Plager further notes that few federal district judges 
have technical or patent law backgrounds and that judges are unlikely to choose law 
clerks with such expertise.38  Furthermore, as one source noted, even in those judicial 
districts with very frequent patent litigation, such cases are randomly assigned.39  As a 
result, even judges in these active patent venues do not develop patent expertise.40   
While U.S. patent cases are tried before generalist courts, at the appellate level 
patent cases come before the specialized United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.41  Congress established the Federal Circuit in 1982 and granted it exclusive 
                                                 
35 See 152 Cong. Rec. H7852 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith (R-Tex.)) 
(―On average, an individual federal judge has only 1 patent case go all the way through trial every 
7 years, which means trial-level judges may have no more than 3 or 4 such cases over their entire 
judicial career.‖); Plager, supra note 22, at 77 (estimating that, over a five-year-period, the 
average district court judge heard around three patent cases); cf. Judge James Holderman et al., 
The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United States, 2007 Univ. of Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol‘y 101, 
104-05 (estimating that, during the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2006, the average 
federal district court judge received approximately four patent case filings).  
36 Holderman, supra note 35, at 104. 
37 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 21-
22 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing]  (statement of John B. Pegram) (quoting Avern Cohn, Tenth 
Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 372 
(1993)).  
38 Plager, supra note 22, at 77. 
39 Holderman, supra note 35 (―Each new civil complaint as it is filed in a United States 
District Court is assigned at random to a particular judge of the district court in which that 
complaint is filed.‖).  
40 See Holderman, supra note 35, at 104-05 (explaining that, although the judge‘s district is the 
fifth busiest in the country for intellectual property litigation, in 2006 less than one percent of the 
district‘s docket concerned patents); Cono Carrano et al., Patent Rocket Dockets: Coming Soon to 
a Venue Near You?, Intell. Prop. Today, Dec. 2006, at 10 (stating that ―random case assignments 
prevent many judges from accumulating patent litigation experience,‖ even in courts that 
―frequently hear these controversies‖).  
41 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, About the Court, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited May 2, 2009).  The jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit is not limited to patent appeals, but also includes appeals from the United States 
Court of Federal Claims, the United States Court of International Trade, and the United States 




appellate jurisdiction over patent cases42 in order to harmonize patent law among the 
circuits and also to reduce forum shopping.43  One Federal Circuit judge estimated that 
each judge on his court hears about forty patent cases annually, which affords the 
opportunity to develop significant expertise.44  What is more, some Federal Circuit judges 
have technical backgrounds.45  While commentators have rejected the notion that Federal 
Circuit judges truly have superior relevant technical experience as compared to their 
colleagues at the trial level,46 it should be noted that each Federal Circuit judge enjoys the 
assistance of three law clerks,47 most of whom have scientific training,48 as well as help 
from a small central staff of technical advisors.49   
                                                                                                                                                 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.  Id. The court also takes appeals of certain administrative 
agencies‘ decisions, including the United States Merit Systems Protection Board, the Board of 
Contract Appeals, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and the Trademark Trial and 
Appeals Board.  Id.   
42 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006)).   
43 See id.; H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (―A single court of appeals for patent cases will 
promote certainty where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate, the 
forum-shopping that now occurs.‖); see also LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: 
Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology 
Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1, 19 (―[T]he Federal Circuit was established to provide 
uniformity in the application of intellectual property law, prevention of forum shopping among 
federal courts, and specialized expertise in a complex body of law.‖ (citations omitted)).  
44 Plager, supra note 22, at 78. Another Federal Circuit judge estimated the number of patent 
appeals as ―perhaps 60 or 70 per judge per year‖ as compared to the few patent cases a typical 
trial judge hears annually.  Judge Alan D. Lourie, Speech to PTC Section of D.C. Bar (June 12, 
2000), in 60 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. 147, ¶ 17 (2000) [hereinafter Lourie]. 
45 See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (seven of the sixteen 
Federal Circuit judges, Judges Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Mayer, Moore, Newman, and Prost, have 
technical educational credentials); see also Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of 
Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). 
46 See Moore, Markman, supra note 5, at 245 (explaining that a relatively low percentage of 
Federal Circuit judges actually have technical training and that these particular judges do not 
reverse district court claim construction rulings any more often that their non-technically trained 
colleagues); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the 
Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 Geo. L.J. 269, 315 (2007) (―[I]t is not 
clear that Federal Circuit judges know more about any given technology than a generalist judge 
would. The specialization required to understand the underlying technologies is so great that a 
background in patent law—or even a general science background—will provide little advantage 
when a judge is dealing with factual findings on a complex technological matter.‖).  
47
 See Rooklidge & Shah, supra note 8, at 8. 




In addition to the enhanced patent trial experience, technical training, and 
technical assistance Federal Circuit judges enjoy, another possible cause of the high 
appellate reversal rate of trial court claim construction decisions is the standard of review 
that the Federal Circuit applies in considering such decisions.50  Because Markman I 
deemed claim construction a legal, rather than a factual, matter that therefore must be 
decided by judges rather than juries,51 the Federal Circuit reviews de novo claim 
construction decisions of the federal district courts.52  As one federal district court judge 
explained, the de novo standard of review permits the Federal Circuit to ―look at our 
determinations anew and determine the correctness of our rulings‖ as to claim 
construction ―based upon what counsel for the parties present to the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit by way of both factual and legal argument, not what was presented to 
us trial court judges.‖53 
                                                                                                                                                 
48 See Lourie, supra note 44, ¶ 18 (―Perhaps 80 to 90% of our law clerks have technical 
backgrounds to help us understand the patents, a benefit trial judges rarely have.‖).  
49 See Hearing, supra note 37, at 23; see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 46, at 314 (stating 
that the Federal Circuit has ―a small technical staff‖). 
50 See Cybor v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting 
from the pronouncements on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in the 
judgment) (critiquing the de novo standard of review in patent claim construction cases, which he 
stated has resulted in a nearly 40 percent reversal rate since Markman I); see also Moore, 
Markman, supra note 5, at 232 n.2  (gathering citations in support of the argument that the current 
claim construction process is flawed due to the Federal Circuit‘s de novo review as well as its 
lack of guidance to lower courts, and opining that such criticism is warranted).  For interesting 
hypotheses regarding other possible causes of the instability between trial and appellate decisions 
regarding claim construction, see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, 
Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 Hastings L.J. 1025, 1094 (2007) 
(stating that while ―[s]pecialized courts would undoubtedly improve administration of patent 
litigation,‖ empirical analysis indicates that ―the indeterminacy of patent law, rather than the 
application of patent law by the district courts or the Federal Circuit‘s review of the district 
courts, is responsible for‖ the high appellate reversal rate of trial court patent claim construction 
decisions). See also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of 
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 1033, 1050-63 (2007) (contending that the high 
appellate claim construction reversal rate may stem from differences in the content and order of 
presentation of the information trial and appellate judges considered in patent proceedings and 
advocating for standardization of the order and mode in which information is received and 
processed during the claim construction inquiry). 
51 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (―Because claim construction is a matter of law, the construction given 
the claims reviewed is de novo on appeal.‖). 
52 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456 (holding that claim construction is ―a purely legal question‖ that 
would be reviewed ―de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to 
claim construction‖).  
53 Holderman, supra note 35, at 107 (citation omitted). 




While the Federal Circuit has the authority to review district court claim 
construction decisions de novo, the appellate court has provided scant and often 
conflicting guidance to the lower courts in terms of methodology to be applied in 
conducting the claim construction process.54  This lack of guidance is to some extent 
unavoidable given that judges face significant factual differences in each claim 
construction matter that render claim construction in one case inapplicable to another.  
What is more, the definition of a claim term in one patent has no precedential effect upon 
the meaning to be given to the same claim term used in another patent in a different field 
of art.55 
An additional procedural complexity facing district court judges is the failure of 
the Federal Circuit to provide district court judges ―with a set of uniform rules for the 
timing‖ of the Markman claim construction hearing.56  Eighty-one percent of district 
courts hold claim construction hearings, and the timing of such hearings varies greatly. 57  
According to one commentator, fifty-eight percent of claim construction rulings occur 
after discovery but before trial; twenty-two percent are held during discovery; twelve 
percent take place at trial, and only eight percent are held before discovery. 58  
Furthermore, since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Markman, district courts are twice as 
likely to decide patent cases based on summary judgment. 59  According to Judge 
Holderman, ―The ad hoc manner in which claim construction is decided increases 
unpredictability and expense, especially if, after discovery, and a trial or determination on 
a motion for summary judgment, a Federal Circuit panel reverses the district court‘s 
claim construction.‖60 
In light of the challenges facing district court judges engaged in patent claim 
construction, it is not surprising that the Federal Circuit reverses an estimated thirty to 
                                                 
54 See id. at 108-09 (explaining that although the Federal Circuit has denoted the sources that 
district court judges must consult in reaching claim construction decisions, the appellate court has 
not set forth the ―value and weight to be accorded any inconsistent information stemming‖ from 
these sources).  
55 See id. at 109-10. 
56 Id. at 110. 
57 Cheryl L. Johnson, Why Judges are Destined to Flunk Their Markman Tests: The History of 
Their Claim Construction Assignment, 873 PLI/PAT 9, 59 (2006). 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 61.  As one commentator noted, ―parties often resort to filing summary 
judgment motions in the hope that the court will hold a Markman hearing to decide the claim 
construction issue, even if the overall summary judgment motion is unsuccessful.‖ Robert C. 
Weiss et al., Markman Practice, Procedure and Tactics, in Patent Litigation 2000  148, 149 (PLI 
Intell. Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-619, 2000). 
60 Holderman, supra note 35, at 110. 




fifty-three percent of all patent cases on appeal. 61  This compares unfavorably to an 
average reversal rate of less than nine percent for all district court decisions appealed to 
the regional courts of appeals.62   
In an effort to improve the claim construction process, and avoid reversal at the 
appellate level, many district court judges are implementing a solution that presages H.R. 
628.  Commentators explain that ―[a]n increasing number of district court judges are 
delegating claim construction to, or obtaining assistance regarding claim construction 
from, special masters63 [and] ‗technical consultants‘‖64 who are often compensated by the 
parties.65   
                                                 
61 See Carrano, supra note 40, at 10; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text regarding 
appellate claim construction reversal rates.  
62 Office of Judges Programs, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics March 31, 2007 27 tbl.B-5 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2007/tables/B05Mar07.pdf  (giving data for the 12-month 
period ending March 31, 2007).  The Federal Circuit itself had a 13 percent reversal rate for all 
1,678 cases before the court during the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2007.  Id. at 36 
tbl.B-8, available at http://www.uscourtsgov/caseload2007/tables/B08Mar07.pdf.  However, 
Judge Ellis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a frequent patent 
litigation venue, estimates that the appellate reversal rate is approximately twenty to twenty-three 
percent for all cases and approximately twenty-six percent for cases involving de novo review of 
questions of law, and also raises the question ―whether such accurate comparative reversal rates 
are even available.‖  See Letter from Judge Ellis, 16 Fed. Cir. B.J. 1, 1 (2006/2007).    
63 Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes federal courts to appoint Special 
Masters ―to assist judges in pretrial proceedings, discovery, settlement negotiations or arbitration 
between parties, formulating recommendations for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
devising remedies such as monetary damages or injunctive relief.‖  Kondo, supra note 43, at 80-
81.  For a discussion of the increased use of special masters in patent cases, see Kondo, supra 
note 43, at 80-85.  See also Peter J. Chassman, When Markman Hearings Need Special Masters, 
Nat‘l L.J., Oct. 22, 2001, at C8, C8 (explaining that judges sometimes appoint special masters for 
patent claim construction proceedings); Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in 
Patent Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial 
Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1383, 1404 (2003-2004) (―The use of 
special masters in patent infringement trials to decide issues such as claim construction has 
become an accepted practice.‖). 
64 Rooklidge & Shah, supra note 8, at 9 n.37 (citing Wallace, supra note 63, at 1404-06).  For 
a discussion of the frequent use of technical advisors in patent claim construction hearings, see 
Kondo, supra note 43, at 74-76.  In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 706 permits federal judges 
to appoint expert witnesses. See Fed. R. Evid. 706(a). One survey found that Rule 706 experts are 
often appointed in intellectual property cases.  See Kondo, supra note 43, at 78-80. 
65 See William W. Schwarzer & Joe S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence, in Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence 39, 61 (2d ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman0c.pdf/ $file/sciman0c.pdf (explaining that court 
appointment of technical experts and special masters increases the financial obligations of the 




In lieu of this ad hoc approach to achieving technical expertise, H.R. 628 proposes 
to establish a pilot program that would formally designate certain district judges who 
would request to hear patent cases, thereby enhancing their patent litigation experience.  
The hope is that the creation of a specialized cadre of judges with patent trial experience 
would reduce the high appellate claim construction reversal rate.  In order to assess the 
viability of H.R. 628, it is instructive to review the performance of specialized patent trial 
courts in England.  While several nations – notably Germany, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom – have created specialized patent courts,66 the United Kingdom provides the 
most useful comparison in light of the similarities between the U.S. and English patent 
law systems.67  
 
 
III. THE PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN ENGLAND 
 
England68 has established a specialized patent trial court, the Patents Courts, 
which is part of the Chancery Division of the High Court. 69  Established in 1977,70 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
parties); Kondo, supra note 43, at 79 (stating that expert witnesses may receive compensation 
from the parties).  
66 See Kondo, supra note 43, at 90-91 (describing the specialized patent courts of these 
nations).  It should be noted that nations vary greatly in their definitions of specialized intellectual 
property courts.  According to one report, a study conducted by the International Bar Association 
in September 2005 identified Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom as the only 
countries with specialized courts that hear intellectual property cases exclus ively.  Ryan S. 
Goldstein et al., Specialized IP Trial Courts Around the World, Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J., Oct. 
2006, at 1. 
67 See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text for an explanation of the many parallels 
between the U.S. and English patent systems. 
68 This Article focuses specifically on the patent regime in England and Wales, where most 
U.K. patent cases arise.  See Ladas & Parry LLP, Patent Litigation in the United Kingdom, 
http://www.ladas. com/Litigation/ForeignPatentLitigation/UK_Patent_Litigation.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Ladas & Parry] (describing England and Wales as the areas 
where most U.K. patent cases arise).  The court system with respect to patent litigation differs 
significantly in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  See Submission by the United Kingdom, UK 
Background Paper for the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement from the United Kingdom 
Patent Office, WIPO/ACE/2/11 (June 21, 2004), available at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_2/wipo _ace_2_11.doc [hereinafter 
WIPO] (explaining the separate patent court systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland); see also 
John N. Adams & Peter Thomas, The Patents County Court: A Report by the Intellectual 
Property Institute for the European Patent Organisation, at v (1995) (on file with author).  
69 See Kondo, supra note 43, at 90 (―In England, one patent judge and four chancery judges in 
Patents Court, part of the Chancery Division of the High Court, hears [sic] patent disputes.‖); 
John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 
82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc‘y 766, 774 (2000) (stating that one Chancery Court judge is 
designated to hear patent cases in the Patents Court and that several other chancery judges may be 




Patents Court has jurisdiction to hear all intellectual property actions and exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear patent and registered design infringement cases.71  In addition, in 
1990 the United Kingdom Parliament created the Patents County Court (PCC), a small 
claimants‘ court geared toward disputes among small and medium-sized entities.72  The 
jurisdiction of the PCC is coextensive with that of the Patents Court,73 and both of these 
specialist courts share the same procedural rules.74  Appeals from both the Patents Court 
and the PCC lie, with permission, to the generalist Court of Appeal, Civil Division.75  
Further appeal to the House of Lords is possible at the discretion of that court or the 
Court of Appeal.76   
There are many similarities between the U.S. and English patent law systems that 
render it useful to study claim construction decisions in the specialized English patent 
trial courts in order to determine whether H.R. 628 would improve the claim construction 
process in the U.S. district courts.  First, as one scholar has noted, ―US patent law is 
ultimately grown from a British seed, for the ‗newly discovered‘ North America inherited 
                                                                                                                                                 
assigned to hear such cases).  The Patents Court has jurisdiction over all patent disputes for which 
the act of infringement was committed in England or Wales.  Adams & Thomas, supra note 68, at 
14. 
70 David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the European 
Union, 20 Fordham Int‘l L.J. 549, 564 n.74 (1996) (explaining that the Patents Court was 
established under § 96 of the 1977 Patents Act, and that even before that, English patent disputes 
had been assigned to specialist patent judges since the 1950s).  
71 WIPO, supra note 68, at 1. 
72 Pegram, supra note 69, at 774; see also Adams & Thomas, supra note 68, at v (―The Patents 
County Court was established in 1990 as an attempt to provide a cheaper tribunal before which to 
litigate patent disputes in England and Wales.‖).  As the current PCC judge noted, however, there 
are no jurisdictional limits to the factual or legal complexity of PCC cases.  See Michael Fysh, 
The Work of the Patents County Court, Oxford Intell. Prop. Res. Centre E-Journal of Intell. Prop. 
Rights, Feb. 11, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0303.pdf. 
73 See Adams & Thomas, supra note 68, at 2; Pegram, supra note 69, at 774-75 (―Called a 
‗County Court‘ because the PCC is administratively connected to the County Court system, the 
jurisdiction of the PCC has neither of the usual County Court limits of amount in dispute or of 
geography.  It has jurisdiction in all of England and Wales.‖).  The PCC does not, however, have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from Patent Office decisions.  Peter Ford, Patent Litigation: A Better 
Deal for Litigants, 12 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 435, 435 (1990). 
74 Richard Willoughby, Intellectual Property: The Choice Is Yours, Legal Wk., Mar. 3, 2005,  
http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/123246/Intellectual+Property+The+choice+is+yours.html 
(―With the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) in 1999, there is no longer any 
difference between the High Court and county courts in procedural terms.‖).  
75 WIPO, supra note 68, at 2; Pegram, supra note 69, at 774; see also Adams & Thomas, 
supra note 68, at 25, 36; Kondo, supra note 43, at 90. 
76 Pegram, supra note 69, at 774; see also WIPO, supra note 68, at 2; Adams & Thomas, 
supra note 68, at 25. 




the English law concerning monopolies upon colonization.‖ 77  Second, the basic 
requirements of patentability — novelty, utility, and nonobviousness — are the same in 
both jurisdictions.78  Third, both U.S. and English law have adopted patent claims as a 
means of demarcating the boundaries of a patentee‘s right. 79  Fourth, in both jurisdictions 
claims are directed toward a person skilled in the relevant art, meaning that the court 
must consider the claim from the perspective of such a person.80  Fifth, the discovery 
process is similar in both jurisdictions, albeit more extensive in the United States.81  
Sixth, in both jurisdictions claim construction is a matter for a judge, not a jury. 82  
Seventh, in both jurisdictions trial judges and appellate judges deciding patent matters are 
appointed for lifetime terms.83  Eighth, the appellate courts in both the United States and 
                                                 
77 Fisher, supra note 23, at 271. 
78 See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the 
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use 
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623, 1637-38, 1644-45 (2001) (setting forth the criteria for 
patentability in the U.S. and the E.U., of which the U.K. is a member).  
79
 See Fisher, supra note 23, at 266-67 (explaining that patent claims are used in the both the U.K. and 
U.S, as well as in ―all major industrialized countries‖); see also John A. Duffy, On Improving the Legal 
Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives , 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol‘y 109, 110 (2000) 
(―The success of the modern patent claim is demonstrated by its universal adoption in the patent law of all 
major industrialized countries.‖). 
80 See Fisher, supra note 23, at 271. 
81 See Richard Price, Patent Litigation in England – Quiet Revolution, 17 Eur. Intell. Prop. 
Rev. 290, 290-92 (1995) (stating that the English discovery process is less of a ―burden on 
litigants‖ than in the U.S.); see also Perkins & Mills, supra note 70, at 564 (noting that there is 
document discovery in the English patent litigation system, unlike in continental Europe); Ladas 
& Parry, supra note 68 (―Discovery does exist in English proceedings, although it is not as 
extensive as in the United States (for example, there is no deposition practice).‖).  
82 See supra note 28 and accompanying text regarding the United State Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Markman declaring that claim construction is a matter for judge, not juries.  Indeed, in 
Markman, the Supreme Court relied explicitly on U.K. precedent in deciding that patent claim 
construction is a matter for a judge rather than a jury.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 381-82 (1996); Adams & Thomas, supra note 68, at 15 (stating that Patents 
Court trials are ―by judge alone‖), 31 (stating that trials before the PCC are normally before the 
judge sitting alone, although technical assistance is available when needed); Paul R. Michel, A 
View From The Bench: Achieving Efficiency and Consistency, 19 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 41, 
46 (2000-2001) (The Honorable Paul R. Michel, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, in critiquing the U.S. practice of making jury trials available in patent 
cases, stated that ―[e]ven England stopped having jury trials in patent cases at the beginning of 
the last century.‖). 
83 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (providing that Article III judges ―shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour,‖ which has been interpreted to mean that judges may serve for the remainder of 
their lives); E-mail from The Honorable Mr. Justice David Kitchin, Senior Judge of the Patents 
Court of the High Court of Justice in England and Wales, to author (Nov. 5, 2008, 03:41 E.S.T.) 




England review de novo the trial court‘s construction of the claims. 84  Finally, in both 
jurisdictions, claim construction is often determinative of the litigation‘s outcome. 85 
The most striking difference between the U.S. and English patent regimes is the 
specialized patent trial court system established in the latter jurisdiction.  Significantly, 
some of the judges in the English system possess a technical degree, and ―all have 
technical experience.‖86  Thus, an examination of the rate of appellate reversal of patent 
                                                                                                                                                 
(on file with author).  English judges, however, face a mandatory retirement age of seventy years.  
Id. 
84 See supra note 50 and accompanying text regarding the Federal Circuit‘s decision in Cybor 
that claim construction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo by the appellate court.  
Similarly, in England, ―[t]he Court of Appeal is there to decide if the first instance Judge has 
erred as a matter of law in any decision that has been reached.‖  E-mail from Doug Bell, Clerk of 
the Lists, Her Majesty‘s Court Service, to author (Nov. 5, 2007, 04:54 E.S.T.) (on file with 
author).  As explained in a significant English Court of Appeal decision: 
The review [of a lower court decision] will engage the merits of the appeal.  It will accord 
appropriate respect to the decision of the lower court.  Appropriate respect will be tempered by 
the nature of the lower court and its decision making process.  There will also be a spectrum of 
appropriate respect depending on the nature of the decision of the lower court which is 
challenged.  At one end of the spectrum will be the decisions of primary fact reached after an 
evaluation of oral evidence where credibility is in issue and purely discretionary decisions.  
Further along the spectrum will be multi-factorial decisions often dependent on inferences and an 
analysis of documentary material. 
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. S. T. Dupont, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2793, 2800 (C.A. (Civ. 
Div.)).  Cf. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 389 (stating that, with respect to expert testimony presented 
in claim construction hearings, while credibility determinations theoretically could play a role in 
claim construction, the chance of such an occurrence is ―doubtful‖ and that ―any credibility 
determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole 
document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that 
comports with the instrument as a whole‖).  
85 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text for information regarding the importance of 
claim construction in U.S. patent litigation; see also Molnlycke AB v. Procter & Gamble Ltd., 
[1994] R.P.C. 49, 76 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)) (―As is often the case the issue [of infringement] is 
largely determined by deciding the proper construction of the patent.‖).  
86 E-mail from Elaine Harbert, Senior Personal Secretary to The Chancellor of The High 
Court, The Right Honorable Sir Andrew Morritt, Royal Courts of Justice, to author (Feb. 28, 
2008, 04:43 E.S.T.) (on file with author); see also WIPO, supra note 68, at 1 (―In the Patents 
Court there are a number of full-time assigned judges who have a technical background, the court 
therefore has extensive experience of patent law and the ability to deal with complicated 
technologies.  Additionally, scientific advisers can be appointed to the court to assist the judge.‖); 
Perkins & Mills, supra note 70, at 564 (explaining that the English Patents Court and Patents 
County Court ―have judges who have considerable experience in dealing with patent disputes and 
are experienced patent practitioners‖); Her Majesty‘s Courts Service, The Patents Court, 
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/patents/crt_guide.htm (last visited May 2, 2009).; 




claim construction decisions by the specialized trial judges of the English Patents Court 
and Patents County Court is an instructive statistic in any consideration of H.R. 628.  If 
England does indeed have a lower appellate reversal rate of claim construction decisions, 
this suggests that legislation aimed at enhancing the patent expertise of a group of U.S. 
district court judges has the potential to reduce the rate at which the Federal Circuit 
reverses district court claim construction decisions.   
H.R. 628 might also decrease the cost of U.S. patent litigation.  A 2005 survey 
revealed that, in the United States, the costs of taking a patent litigation through the 
discovery phase ranged from $350,000 to $3,000,000, and the costs of taking a patent 
case through appeal ranged from $650,000 to $4,500,000.87  By contrast, in England, 
which is the most expensive country in Europe for patent litigation, the costs during the 
same time period ranged from approximately £200,000 (approximately US $370,000) to 
£1,500,000 (approximately US $2,775,000).88 
The higher cost of patent litigation in the United States as compared to England 
arises at least in part from the unpredictability of patent litigation in the former nation (as 
manifested by the high appellate reversal rate of claim construction decisions).  This 
unpredictability makes it difficult for parties to make realistic assessments of their 
likelihood of ultimate success when they proceed through costly discovery, pretrial 
proceedings, and trial.  In addition, because the average district court judge hears so few 
patent cases annually,89 it falls to the parties to inform the judge about changes in patent 
law as well as to educate her with respect to the technology at issue in any given case, 90 
                                                                                                                                                 
As for the PCC, Judge Fysh, the current judge of that court, has explained there is a single 
PCC judge, and that person is required to be ―scientifically qualified.‖  Fysh, supra note 72, at 2.  
Judge Fysh describes himself as an ―ex-chemist.‖  Id.  His predecessor, Judge Peter Ford, was a 
patent attorney for over twenty-five years and then served as the first British member of the 
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office for about a decade before he became the first 
Patents County Court judge.  Andrew Webb, Patent Litigation in the UK – The New Patents 
County Court, 1991 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 203, 205. 
There are also judges with patent experience serving on the non-specialized English Court of 
Appeal.  See Price, supra note 81, at 290 (mentioning Judge Jacob, formerly of the Patents Court 
and now of the Court of Appeal, and Judge Aldous); Her Majesty‘s Courts Service, The Court of 
Appeal, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1287.htm (last visited May 2, 2009). 
87 Salvatore Anastasi & Kevin Alan Wolff, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass‘n, Report of the 
Economic Survey 2005, at I-108 - I-110 (2005).  
88 Ray Black, Never Mind the Quality, Feel the Pinch, Managing Intell. Prop., May 1, 2005, at 
27. 
89 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.  
90 See John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent 
Jurisdiction Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 Hous. L. Rev. 67, 76 (1995) 
(describing the average trial court judge‘s lack of experience in substantive and procedural 
matters relating to patent litigation). 




which may include paying for experts to advise the judge.91  Naturally, some of the cost 
of U.S. patent litigation is attributable to the longer and more complex discovery process 
in the United States.92  However, even this is exacerbated by the uncertainty arising from 
the high appellate claim construction reversal rate.  In the United States, pretrial 
discovery, motion practice, and trial all occur before the party who lost the claim 
construction determination can appeal this issue to the Federal Circuit.  As Judge 
Holderman noted, ―Should the Federal Circuit on appeal determine that the district 
judge‘s claim construction was erroneous, all the money and time spent litigating the case 
in the district court following that erroneous claim construction by the district court is 
thus a wasted expense.‖93  Thus, improving claim construction at the trial level can 
provide needed certainty to the patent litigation process, and it is worthwhile to examine 
how England has achieved this goal with specialized patent trial courts.   
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH APPELLATE REVERSAL RATE OF TRIAL COURT 
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION DECISIONS 
 
This empirical portion of this Article examines the appellate reversal rate of claim 
construction decisions of the specialized English patent courts, including the Patents 
Court, Chancery Division, and the Patents County Court, with the aim of assessing the 
potential effectiveness of H.R. 628.  The English appellate reversal rate, which ranges 
from 14.7 to 28.2 percent, depending upon how it is measured, is less than that of the 
Federal Circuit.  These statistics thus provide some empirical evidence that specialist 
judges do indeed have the potential to reduce the appellate claim construction reversal 
rate in the United States.  As noted previously, English and U.S. approaches to patent 
litigation are quite similar, and differ mainly in terms of the patent expertise of the trial 
judges deciding patent actions.94 
 
A. Empirical Research Methodology and Analysis 
In formulating my research methodology, I am greatly indebted to the work of 
Professor Kimberly A. Moore, now a Federal Circuit judge; this Article builds upon her 
                                                 
91 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.  
92 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
93 Holderman, supra note 35, at 10; see also Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, 
supra note 5, at 2-3 (―In the absence of a route for expedited appeal of claim construction, district 
courts are forced to proceed with lengthy and expensive patent litigation based on their frequently 
erroneous claim construction.‖). 
94 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.  




scholarly research.95  I created a database containing all appellate claim construction 
decisions in England from 1996 through 2007, examining decisions of both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords.96  For each appellate case, the information gathered 
included: the parties; judges; court; decision date; whether the appeal(s) were granted, 
dismissed, or granted in part and dismissed in part; the number of constructions of 
individual patent claim terms reversed on appeal; and whether any decision by the 
appellate court to grant an appeal resulted from the appellate court‘s reversal of a lower 
court‘s claim construction decision.  I then examined each related trial court case, 
gathering information that included: the parties; judge; court; decision date; prevailing 
party; and the number of individual patent claim terms construed.  The total number of 
appellate court decisions included in the database was 58, and the total number of 
individual claim terms construed was 153.   
Using this data from English claim construction cases, I was able to calculate 
English appellate court claim construction reversal rates and compare them with the most 
recent and reliable U.S. figures,97 which come from Professor Moore‘s 2005 article 
analyzing all Federal Circuit claim construction decisions from 1996 through 2003. 98  In 
order to render my results comparable to Judge Moore‘s, I calculated the appellate 
reversal rate for the period 1996 through 2003.  In addition, in order to render my 
research as current as possible, I also analyzed the data from the period 1996 through 
2007.  
In calculating the appellate court claim construction reversal rate, I computed it in 
three different ways, as did Judge Moore in her 2005 study. 99  In that article, Judge 
Moore explained that ―reversal rate‖ can be interpreted in one of three ways.  First, it may 
refer to the rate at which the appellate court determined that the trial court erred in the 
construction of individual terms in a patent claim, on a term-by-term basis, even if the 
appellate court did not actually reverse the lower court‘s overall judgment.  We could 
represent this ratio as TR/T, where TR equals the total number of claim terms reversed at 
the appellate level and T equals the total number of claim terms construed at the appellate 
level.  Second, the reversal rate could mean the percentage of cases in which the appellate 
court reversed the trial court‘s construction of one or more claim terms.  We could 
                                                 
95 See generally Moore, Markman, supra note 5; Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, 
supra note 5. 
96 In order to create this data set, I conducted a search on Westlaw in the file entitled United 
Kingdom Reports All, using the query ―patent & claim /s interp! or constru!‖  Professor Moore 
formulated this search for her seminal 2001 article concerning the Federal Circuit‘s claim 
construction reversal rate.  See Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 8 
n.36; see also Moore, Markman, supra note 5, at 239 n.31 (updating her research using the same 
search terms).  I then examined each case to verify that it did indeed concern construction of a 
patent claim. 
97 See Moore, Markman, supra note 5, at 234-38 (as to the reliability of the cited statistics).  
98 See id. at 239. 
99 See id. at 238. 




represent this ratio as R1/A, where R1 equals the total number of appellate cases where 
one or more claim terms was reversed and A equals the total number of appellate cases 
concerning patent claim construction.  Third, the reversal rate could mean the percentage 
of cases in which a claim construction error actually resulted in reversal of the trial court 
judgment.  We could represent this ratio as RR/A, where RR equals the total number of 
appellate cases where the reversal of a single claim term resulted in a reversal of the trial 
court‘s decision and A again equals the total number of appellate cases concerning patent 
claim construction.  In her 2005 study, Professor Moore calculated these respective 
reversal rates as 34.5 percent, 37.5 percent, and 29.7 percent. 100  For the years 1996 
through 2003, the same period that Professor Moore studied, my findings revealed 
English appellate claim construction reversal rates of 14.7 percent, 28.2 percent, and 25.6 
percent respectively.101  The total number of appellate court decisions included in this 












TR/T 34.5 14.7 15.7 
R1/A 37.5 28.2 27.6 
RR/A 29.7 25.6 25.9 
  
The 95 percent confidence interval of the claim construction reversal rate was 
then calculated for TR/T, where TR equals the total number of claim terms reversed at the 
appellate level and T equals the total number of claim terms construed at the appellate 
                                                 
100 Moore, Markman, supra note 5, at 238. 
101 It should be noted that Judge Peter Ford, who served during the first decade of the PCC, 
from 1990 to 2000, was considered to have a rather high reversal rate.  Michael Burdon, UK 
Patents County Court –  Phoenix Risen?, Patent World, July/Aug. 2003, at 2, available at 
www.olswang.com/pdfs/phoenix_risen.pdf.  Some attributed this to his experience in the 
European system, which is less adversarial.  New Judge for Patents Court, The Law., Oct. 22, 
2001, at 7.  Certainly, lack of technical expertise was not the issue, as Judge Ford spent over three 
decades as a member of the patent bar and judiciary.  Alan Burrington, The UK Patents County 
Court — Is It Still Working?, Patent World, Dec. 1991/Jan. 1992.  Thus, the claim construction 
reversal rate in England is likely somewhat lower at present than the figures cited in this Article 
because the data compiled for use in this Article includes pre-2000 decisions by Judge Ford. 




level.102  A confidence interval of 95 percent means that in repeated confidence 
statements about the reversal rate, based on repeated samples and computed at the given 
level of 95 percent for 95 out of 100 such statements, the unknown true reversal rate will 
actually reside within the data-based interval. 
To calculate the confidence interval, one divides the total number of claim terms 
reversed in all cases from 1996 through 2007, here 24, by the total number of claim terms 
construed during that period, here 153.  This gives the proportion of claim terms reversed 
as 15.7 percent (0.157).  The standard deviation of the observed reversal rate is 4.1 
percent (0.041).  This confidence interval is based upon all the English data from 1996 
through 2007 and is computed using a standard deviation for estimating proportions from 
a clustered sample with clusters of unequal size. 
Note that the term data under discussion consist of clusters of terms.  All terms 
associated with a particular case form a cluster of potentially statistically interdependent 
terms.  Since these clusters vary in size, a ratio estimate was used for computing the 
reversal rate, according to the formula103 
 
p =   i ai /  i Mi 
where ai denotes the number of reversals in case i that had a total of M i terms.  The 
summation extends over all n cases in the data.  We consider the cases as sampled from a 
population of cases from all possible years of interest. 
The standard deviation of the reversal rate per term was computed using the ratio-
estimation variance formula 
 
V(p) = (1-f) /  i Mi
2(pi – p)




f = fraction of cases (clusters) included in the sample  
M = average number of terms per case 
n = number of cases in the sample data   
pi =  a i/Mi 
The summation extends over all cases in the data, as we used the data to estimate 
quantities needed in Cochran‘s original formula (9.32).  The desired standard deviation is 
the square root of this variance.  In using the formula, we took the sampling fraction f to 
be zero, thereby inflating the standard deviation of our estimate, and obtaining the least 
                                                 
102 The author is deeply indebted to Professor Shulamith Gross, Professor of Statistics and 
Computer Information Systems and Director, Statistical Consulting Laboratory, Baruch College, 
City University of New York, for the statistical analysis presented herein. 
103 See William G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques 247 (3d ed. 1977).  




desirable or longest possible confidence interval.  104  The latter interval is obtained as the 
estimate plus or minus twice the standard deviation. 
Thus, one can say with 95 percent confidence that in any given year appellate 
courts in England reverse between 11.6 percent and 19.8 percent of the claim terms they 
construe.  This is substantially lower than Professor Moore‘s corresponding U.S. claim 
construction reversal rate of 34.5 percent.  Because Professor Moore does not compute a 
confidence interval for her data, it is not possible at this time to achieve a more 
statistically accurate comparison of U.S. and English appellate claim construction 
reversal rates based on her data.105 
Nevertheless, the data gathered for this Article support the contention that, from 
1996 through 2003, a significantly lower percentage of claim terms were reversed in 
England upon appeal (14.7 percent), with over twice as many claim terms being reversed 
in the United States (34.5 percent).  Interestingly, in England these reversals of the trial 
court‘s constructions of individual terms affected a relatively larger percentage of the 
appealed cases, so that in 28.2 percent of English cases the appellate court reversed the 
trial court‘s construction of one or more claim terms.  However, the English figure of 
28.2 percent is still considerably lower than the U.S. figure of 37.5 percent.  The most 
similar reversal rate percentage in the United States and England is the one relating to the 
percentage of cases in which the lower court‘s claim construction error actually resulted 
in reversal of the trial court judgment.  This figure was 25.6 percent in England and 29.7 
percent in the United States.  These percentages speak less to the competency of the 
respective court systems, however, and more to the fact that claim construction is truly 
outcome-determinative.106  Updating the English data through 2007 revealed similar 
results.  The appellate claim construction reversal rates in England for the period 1996 
through 2007 were 15.7 percent, 27.6 percent, and 25.9 percent, according to Moore‘s 
three methods of calculation. 
One question that arises from data demonstrating a higher appellate claim 
construction reversal rate in the United States as compared to England is whether the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, as a specialized tribunal with 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases,107 has greater patent expertise than the generalist 
English Court of Appeal, thereby allowing the former court to better detect and reverse 
trial court claim construction errors.  This hypothesis itself posits that specialized courts 
render superior claim construction decisions.108  If this is so, then it is noteworthy that 
                                                 
104 Id. at formula 9.32. 
105 As noted above, however, the U.S. appellate claim construction reversal rate Professor 
Moore calculated is comparable to the rate other scholars have computed.  See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text.  
106 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.  
107 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (describing the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit).  
108 Cf. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 24 (stating that, in the 
United States, ―the frequency with which the Federal Circuit judges are construing claims 




English patent court judges possess more technical experience than Federal Circuit 
judges, few of whom actually have scientific backgrounds. 109  In addition, a theory which 
suggests that the English Court of Appeal somehow overlooks the erroneous patent claim 
construction decisions of the patent trial court is unlikely in light of the fact that the 
English patent court system is highly regarded internationally, as well as by the members 
of the patent bar that practice before it.110   
Alternatively, the lower appellate reversal rate of claim construction decisions in 
England might suggest that the English patent trial courts are more interested in and/or 
adept than the U.S. trial courts at anticipating how the appellate court will decide claim 
construction matters, and thus decide in accordance with the appellate court.  A 
hypothesis about the tendency of English patent court judges to decide matters in a way 
that would avoid reversal is quite difficult to test empirically.  If this is indeed the case, 
such congruent decision-making does not necessarily establish that the trial court 
decisions are incorrect, and is entirely consistent with the notion that specialized English 
patent courts render superior claim construction decisions than U.S. trial courts.  
One could also hypothesize that the lower appellate reversal rate in England 
results from a tendency of the English appellate court to accord deference to the 
specialized patent trials court, although it has the equivalent of de novo review of trial 
court claim construction questions.111   This would be in contrast to the specialized 
Federal Circuit, which conducts true de novo review of federal district court claim 
construction decisions.  The careful analysis of the claim construction decisions of the 
English appellate court conducted for this Article, however, revealed a very thoroughly 
reasoned review process by the appellate judiciary of patent trial claim construction 
decisions, and did not suggest a lenient review process. 
Another question that arises is whether the civil appellate reversal rate for all 
English cases is lower than that in the United States.  The converse is true, in fact.  In the 
United States, as noted above, the average reversal rate was less than 9 percent for all 
district court decisions appealed to the regional courts of appeals during the twelve-
                                                                                                                                                 
suggests that these judges are developing expertise at the task that will increase their ability to 
perform it accurately‖). 
109 See supra notes 45 and 86 and accompanying text.  
110 See, e.g., Price, supra note 81, at 290 (stating that ―the English Civil Courts have a 
worldwide reputation for high-quality decision-making‖ and that the PCC has become so popular 
that it has attracted multinationals among its litigants); Joanne Harris & Ben Moshinsky, Judges 
Survey: Judgment Day, The Lawyer.com, Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-
bin/item.cgi?id=122303&d=122&h=24&f=46 [hereinafter Judgment Day] (quoting a member of 
the patent bar as stating that the patent litigation process is considered to be working well and 
noting that trial times have been greatly reduced due to procedural reforms).  
111 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  




month period ending March 31, 2007.112  In England, the percentage of trial court 
decisions the Court of Appeal reversed for the year 2007 was 41.9 percent.113   
Furthermore, it is instructive to observe that, within England itself, the appellate 
reversal rate for all patent cases (whether relating to claim construction, validity, 
infringement, or some other issue), was only 19 percent in 2007, lower than that for 
nearly every other type of civil action in England. 114  Thus, within England itself, the 
appellate reversal rate of patent court claim construction decisions, whether 14.7, 28.2, or 
25.6 percent, is lower than the appellate reversal rate of most every other category of trial 
court decision.  Indeed, two Patents Court judges, Justices Mann and Kitchin, are 
considered among the best judges in England, with a record of one hundred percent of 
judgments upheld in the Court of Appeal during the 2005-2006 court year.115  The 
foregoing comparison of appellate reversal rates of trial court decisions suggests that the 
specialization of the English patent courts is indeed permitting such courts to perform 
better than generalist English courts, thereby supporting the notion that such a result 
might be replicated in the United States if H.R. 628 were enacted. 
It is important, however, to keep in mind some differences in the U.S. and English 
patent litigation systems that might account at least in part for the lower appellate reversal 
rate of trial court claim construction decisions in England.  First, throughout England, the 
loser pays the litigation fees and expenses of the winner. 116  Second, in England, unlike in 
the United States, juries do not hear patent cases.117  Both of these factors render it likely 
that parties in England are more disposed to settle weak cases than their counterparts in 
the United States.  The higher English settlement rate could possibly affect the appellate 
reversal rate of trial court claim construction decisions, since English patent trial judges 
might enjoy a relatively small docket as compared to their U.S. peers, thereby allowing 
them to spend more time on each case and consequently reach more sound outcomes. 118  
                                                 
112 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
113 See Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2007, at 24 tbl.1.8 (2008), 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm74/7467/7467.pdf; see also Judgment Day, 
supra note 110 (stating that, during the year preceding the Article‘s publication, the average 
English High Court judge in the chancery and commercial courts had approximately thirty-seven 
percent of judgments reversed by the Court of Appeal).   
114
 Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2007, at 24  tbl.1.8 (2008), http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm74/7467/7467.pdf (demonstrating that among the eighteen categories of 
courts from which appeals can be taken to the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division), only the Family 
Division had a lower appellate reversal rate than the Patent Court). 
115 See Judgment Day, supra note 110.  
116 See Herbert M. Kritzer, ―Loser Pays” Doesn’t, Legal Aff., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 24. 
117 See supra note 82. 
118 An English Patents Court judge hears and decides approximately five to seven patent trials 
and appeals from Patent Office decisions annually, along with numerous motions of other kinds 
in patent cases.  Email from David Kitchin, Senior Judge, the Patents Court of the High Court of 




However, the effect of the smaller English docket might be somewhat offset by the fact 
that, since it is likely that weaker cases tend to settle in England, the courts typically hear 
only the more challenging cases.  If that is so, then one would expect that the English 
patent trial courts, which are left with harder cases, to have a higher appellate claim 
construction reversal rate than the U.S. patent trial courts, which face a larger number of 
weaker cases that are therefore easier to decide.  Yet in fact, the English appellate 
reversal rate of claim construction decisions is lower, as demonstrated herein.  
The English patent system also differs from the U.S. system in that business 
methods and software are not as easily patentable in the former jurisdiction.  One recent 
study by Professor Schwartz posits that such patents have a higher appellate claim 
construction reversal rate, as compared to biotech, pharmaceutical, and chemical patents, 
because there is no common scientific vocabulary in the fields of business methods a nd 
software patents, thereby rendering such patents more indeterminate. 119  Thus, the lower 
appellate claim construction reversal rate in England could possibly be attributed to the 
fact that business methods and software are harder to patent than in the U.S.  Professor 
Schwartz also points out, however, that during the period from 1996 to 2007, relatively 
few appellate claim construction appeals involved business method or software 
patents.120 
It should be noted that the data presented in this article include only those trial 
court claim construction decisions that were reviewed on appeal.  This parallels the 
approach used by Professor Moore, who excluded all trial court claim constructions that 
were not appealed, either because the parties settled after the Markman hearing or 
because they simply chose not to appeal.121  Professor Moore acknowledged that this 
approach may have made the appellate reversal rate seem higher than it actually is, since 
it excludes all the trial court decisions that were not appealed, and thus presumably were 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justice in England and Wales, to author (Oct. 24, 2008, 10:01 AM E.S.T.) (on file with author).  
By contrast, a typical U.S. District Court judge serving in one of the jurisdictions with the most 
patent litigation hears roughly between eight and twenty-eight cases annually involving different 
subject matters.  See Statistics Div., Office of Judges Programs, Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, 2007 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts (2008), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf  (using Table C-
7, U.S. District Courts—Civil and Criminal Trials Completed by District, During the 12-Month 
Period Ending September 30, 2007, and Table X-1A, which sets forth the number of authorized 
judgeships per judicial district, to calculate the number of trials per district court judge).  
119 See David L. Schwartz, Confusing Construction or Constructing Confusion? An Empirical 
Study of Patent Claim Construction Reversal Rates Across Technologies, 2009 Intellectual 
Property Roundtable at Drake Law School (Feb. 28, 2009), at 8, 11; see also supra note 50 
(regarding the inherently indeterminate nature of patent language). 
120 E-mail from David L. Schwartz, Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law 
School, to author (Mar. 9, 2009, 9:17 PM E.S.T.) (on file with author) (estimating that business 
method and software patents accounted for less than ten percent of the 1354 patents studied). 
121 See Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 9 (acknowledging this 
limitation in her data); Moore, Markman, supra note 5, at 239 (explaining that this 2005 article 
updates and expands her earlier empirical project, which excluded data relating to claims 
construction cases that were not reviewed on appeal).  




correctly decided.122  On the other hand, she hypothesizes that perhaps ―the cases that are 
appealed are most likely the close cases in which the parties are more likely to disagree 
on the predicted outcome,‖ meaning that the outlier cases where the judge clearly erred in 
construing the claim will likely settle to avoid transaction costs. 123  According to this 
theory, the unappealed claim construction decisions are unlikely to substantially change 
the results of her empirical research.124  Ultimately, Professor Moore concludes that, 
while ―appealed claim construction decisions may not be a random sample of all claim 
construction disputes,‖ her empirical results still shed light on the decision-making ability 
of district court judges.125  Not only Professor Moore, but also many other scholars 
researching the Federal Circuit reversal rate of trial court claim construction decisions , 
limited their studies to appealed cases.126  It is likely that they did so because the only 
way to truly assess if a patent claim was correctly construed, in the eyes of the Federal 
Circuit, is if the trial court‘s claim construction has been reviewed upon appeal.  This 
Article follows a similar approach. 
 
B. Conclusions Drawn With Respect to H.R. 628 Based upon the Empirical Data 
The lower English appellate reversal rate of claim construction decisions suggests 
that a specialist court can indeed serve to reduce the reversal rate.127  The next question 
that arises is what sort of experience the judges on the specialist court must have in order 
                                                 
122 See Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 9-10. 
123 See id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
124 See id.  
125 See id.   
126 See supra note 5.   
127 According to one empirical study conducted by Professor Schwartz, United States district 
court judges do not actually improve their skills at patent claim construction as a function of 
experience, which includes having their decisions reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.  See generally David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study 
of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223 (2008).  This could 
suggest that ―funneling patent cases via the Patent Pilot Program to a smaller subset of judges on 
its own is unlikely to reduce the reversal rate.‖  Id. at 262.  As Professor Schwartz acknowledges, 
however, it is possible that district court judges may need a greater number of claim construction 
appeals, rather than the two or three they decide on average in an over ten-year period, in order to 
gain the experience necessary to improve their claim construction reversal rates.  What is more, 
as Professor Schwartz points out, H.R. 628 might also decrease the appellate claim construction 
reversal rate in the United States by allowing judges with the most interest in patent cases to 
handle such cases; by funding the appointment of law clerks with technical experience; and by 
enabling certain designated patent judges to develop a reputation for sound decision-making that 
would potentially allow the Federal Circuit to accord deference to these highly respected district 
court judges.  Id. at 262 nn.19 & 263. 




to make accurate claim construction decisions; for example, technical education or prior 
experience with patent law may be required.  This issue is important in light of the fact 
that H.R. 628 proposes to designate certain judges as patent judges and permit them to 
decide a greater proportion of patent matters, but does not require that such judges have 
technical training. 
It would seem that, even more important than technical training, is the fact that 
English patent judges hear numerous patent cases and in this way enhance their expertise.  
In the United States, it appears that technical education and prior patent expertise are 
uncorrelated with claim construction reversal rates, based upon scholarly research 
demonstrating that the rate at which a Federal Circuit judge reverses district court claim 
construction decisions is entirely unrelated to the district judge‘s technical education and 
prior patent expertise.128 
In England, presently just three of the seven Patents Court judges have ―specialist 
IP backgrounds.‖129  According to one spokesperson for the English High Court, of 
which the Patents Court is a part: 
 
All the judges bring their varying amounts of technical experience from 
their respective practices, and they all acquire further experience in the 
course of their Patent Court work.  The English practice of concentrating 
patent work in the hands of a limited number of judges in the Patents 
Court, rather than spreading the work more generally, has the further 
effect of increasing the exposure of that limited number to technical issues 
and focussing the combined experience accordingly. 130  
 
Indeed, because H.R. 628 allows judges to self-select into the pool of judges 
handling patent cases,131 it is likely that judges who are designated patent specialists will 
have the interest and aptitude to handle such cases well.  In addition, the judges‘ inherent 
intellectual interest will be further enhanced by H.R. 628‘s funding for educational 
programs aimed at developing their technical expertise.132  H.R. 628 will also provide 
                                                 
128 See Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 5, at 26-27 (defining prior 
patent experience as expertise gained as a member of the patent bar or as an academic). 
129 See E-mail from The Honorable Mr. Justice David Kitchin, Senior Judge of the Patents 
Court of the High Court of Justice in England and Wales, to author (Nov. 19, 2008, 3:37 AM 
E.S.T.) (on file with author).  
130 E-mail from Elaine Harbert, Senior Personal Secretary to The Chancellor of The High 
Court, The Right Honorable Sir Andrew Morritt, Royal Courts of Justice, to author (Mar. 3, 2008, 
9:17 AM E.S.T.) (on file with author).  
131 See H.R. 628, 111th Cong. (2009); Olson, supra note 12, at 755. 
132 See H.R. 628, 111th Cong. (2009); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 




funds for hiring clerks with scientific and technical educational credentials, an advantage 
currently enjoyed by Federal Circuit judges, most of whom are not patent experts. 133   
  
V. THE ADVANTAGES OF H.R. 628 OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SPECIALIZED PATENT 
COURT 
 
In light of the apparent advantages of the English specialized patent courts, it is 
important to ask why H.R. 628 proposes a system of funneling patent cases to certain 
generalist judges, rather than a system establishing specialized courts modeled upon those 
in England.  Traditionally, the weight of scholarly and judicial opinion has opposed 
increased specialization in the U.S. federal courts. 134  Commentators raise several 
concerns about such courts.  First, specialized courts are vulnerable to capture by a 
particular constituency, and there is the possibility that patent courts would favor certain 
ideological positions.135  Second, establishing a single patent trial court would eliminate 
the ―percolation‖ that occurs when numerous trial courts grapple with similar legal issues 
and converge on the optimal legal rules.136  Because the United States already has a 
                                                 
133 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.  
134 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts to 
Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 Judicature 217, 224 (1991) (contending that judicial specialization 
may unintentionally affect judicial decision making and advocating careful review of proposals 
for specialized courts); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a 
Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425-26 (1951) (arguing against the creation of 
specialized patent courts); Transcript: Franklin Pierce Law Center Second Patent System Major 
Problems Conference, Thursday March 23, 1989, 30 IDEA 107, 212-14 (1989) (quoting Chief 
Judge Markey, the first judge of the Federal Circuit, who opposes the establishment of specialized 
patent trial courts, even as he had supported the establishment of the Federal Circuit)..  
135 Pegram, U.S. Court of International Trade, supra note 90, at 125-26; see also Improving 
Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter Moore Testimony] (statement of Professor Kimberly A. Moore) (proposing the 
designation of patent judges, ideally with a technical education or patent background, in each 
judicial district); Goldstein, supra note 66, at 4 (―Another criticism is that specialized courts may 
be particularly susceptible to special interest group manipulation.  A specialized judiciary may 
become susceptible to political lobbying, a stratified bar, or special interest group manipulation 
that would ensure the appointment of favorable judges to the specialized courts.‖). 
Even under the system H.R. 628 proposes, the possibility exists that ideological generalist 
federal judges will elect to hear patent cases so as to influence the law in that area.  
136 See Moore Testimony, supra note 135 (―[H]aving only one trial court for all patent cases 
would eliminate the percolation that currently occurs among the various district courts.  Having 
numerous courts simultaneously considering similar issues permits the law to evolve and often 
aids in flushing out the best legal rules.‖); Pegram, U.S. Court of International Trade, supra note 




specialized appellate court that resolves all patent cases, there is concern that the creation 
of a single specialized patent trial court would result in ―too much specialization.‖ 137  
Third, as a related matter, confining decision-making to a limited number of specialized 
courts will impede the flow of new ideas from areas of law other than intellectual 
property, and could result in a myopic focus.138  The proposal offered by H.R. 628 avoids 
these concerns and would be one step toward improving the appellate claim construction 
reversal rate and enhancing judicial efficiency in patent cases, which are important goals.   
Commentators have, however, voiced concerns about H.R. 628.  First, some 
contend that H.R. 628 will foster forum-shopping by encouraging litigants to file patent 
cases in those districts that have specialist judges.139  One commentator contends that 
once there is enough information to determine how the designated judges decide claim 
construction issues (for example, whether a particular judge narrowly or expansively 
construes claims), it is likely that patent litigants will select particular districts with this 
information in mind.140  The drafters of H.R. 628 have modified the legislation to include 
a safeguard that will minimize forum shopping, specifying that the pilot program can 
exist only if a court has at least ten district judges and at least three of the judges have 
requested to hear such cases.141  What is more, in the opinion of Judge Holderman, forum 
shopping based on a court‘s expertise is not deleterious, in contrast to forum shopping 
intended to secure an individual litigant a preferred outcome. 142   
Another concern about forum shopping that arises in connection with H.R. 628 is 
the speculation that certain smaller judicial districts that are not eligible to participate in 
the pilot program, but which have become desirable patent litigation venues due to their 
development of effective local patent rules that enhance efficiency, such as the Eastern 
District of Texas, may not hear as many cases if Congress enacts H.R. 628.  Judge 
                                                                                                                                                 
90, at 123 (speaking of the ―[p]ercolation of ideas in patent law‖ that arises ―through attention to 
patent issues in a number of trial courts‖). 
137 See Moore Testimony, supra note 135, at 10. 
138 See Goldstein, supra note 66, at 4; Pegram, U.S. Court of International Trade, supra note 
90, at 123-25. 
139 See Lynn Malinoski, Why Does Congress Care Where Patent Cases Are Filed?, The Legal 
Intelligencer, Oct. 18, 2006, at 5, available at 
http://www.woodcock.com/publications/newsletters/intellectual%20property%20perspectives%2
0fall%202006%20newsletter.pdf. 
140 See id. 
141 H.R. 628, 111th Cong. §1(b) (2009); see also supra note 14.  This provision was not 
included in the original version of the bill.  Malinowski, supra note 139, at 3. 
142 See Holderman, supra note 35, at 120 (―While I believe that forum shopping generally 
should be discouraged, in this instance, where the choice of forum is based on a district‘s 
development of an expertise in the complicated area of patent law, the federal judicial system of 
our country will not be harmed by encouraging this type of forum selection.‖).  




Holderman has expressed his belief that this result is unlikely, given that some l itigants 




The empirical analysis presented in this article supports the notion that a current 
Congressional bill, H.R. 628, which proposes to enhance the patent expertise of certain 
federal district court judges by allowing them to elect to hear more patent cases, offers 
the potential to reduce the relatively high appellate reversal rate of patent claim 
construction decisions in the United States.  The examination of English data sheds light 
on this issue, since the English and U.S. patent litigation processes are quite similar, 
differing primarily in that the former nation has specialized patent trial courts while the 
latter does not.  Based upon the considerably lower appellate reversal rates in England as 
opposed to the United States, it appears worthwhile to implement the pilot project that 
H.R. 628 proposes.  For a relatively low cost and without much disruption to the existing 
federal court structure, H.R. 628 offers the potential to reduce the appellate claim 
construction reversal rate, thereby affording needed certainty to U.S. inventors and 
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